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CIVIL PUNISHMENT AND THE
PUBLIC GOOD
DAVID G. OWEN*
For thousands of years, in many diverse civilizations, the law has pro-
vided for "damages" in addition to compensation for actual losses to
persons injured by certain types of highly antisocial behavior., Some-
times wearing the thin disguise of multiple damages,2 "punitive" or
"exemplary" damages have established a secure home in the legal sys-
tem prevailing in this nation. Professor Ellis' article, Fairness and Effi-
ciency in the Law of Punitive Damages,3 makes a major contribution to
the understanding of this area of the law. His study demonstrates con-
vincingly that an unbridled, expansive application of punitive damages
is undesirable on grounds of fairness and efficiency.
In the following Comment, I shall briefly reexamine some of the
principle issues of fairness and efficiency in the law of punitive dam-
ages. My analysis assumes the existence and limits of the current legal
system, in which compensatory damages (in civil actions) and formal
punishment (in criminal prosecutions) are complementary legal tools.
Yet I also take as an established fact that the coverage of the criminal
law is spotty, to say the least, and that it leaves virtually untouched,
properly perhaps, certain broad areas of serious misbehavior.'
I shall first examine the essence of the misconduct that gives rise to
punitive damages assessments and shall isolate certain contexts in
which such claims are made and sometimes sustained. After a capsule
inquiry into the primary purposes (benefits, one might say) of punitive
damages, I shall look briefly at some of their principal costs-in partic-
* Professor of Law, University of South Carolina. B.S. 1967, J.D. 1971, University of
Pennsylvania. This essay benefited from comments on an earlier draft by Nathan M. Crystal and
F. Patrick Hubbard.
1. See Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MicH. L. REv. 1257,
1262 nn.17-18 (1976).
2. Id. at 1262 n.17.
3. Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. I (1982).
4. Manufacturing decisions, for example, are largely beyond the reach of the criminal law.
See Owen, supra note 1, at 1288 & n.156.
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ular, some of the implications of uncertainty in this area of the law.
Finally, I shall suggest certain methods for increasing fairness-with-
out significantly sacrificing efficiency-in punitive damages law.
I. NATURE OF PUNISHABLE MISCONDUCT
A. A POWER PERSPECTIVE
The study of legal principles is often advanced by a consideration of
the power relationships between the parties.5 Such an analysis is par-
ticularly helpful in reaching the essence of the conduct for which puni-
tive damages may be warranted. As in much of tort law, the proscribed
behavior that will support a punitive award involves at bottom an
abuse of power, particularly one which is extreme. The defendant's
position of power over the plaintiff's welfare may derive from most any
type of relationship, from the most formal and direct-such as a doctor
to his patient-to the most tenuous and remote-such as a component
part manufacturer to a bystander injured by a defective product. In
instances when punitive damages appear most appropriate, the amount
of power held by the defendant (and commensurate vulnerability of the
plaintiff) often is great and its abuse, for one reason or another, ex-
treme. One might picture a giant boulder perched at the top of the
defendant's hill-and the plaintiff's little cottage and family nestled
among the daffodils in the valley below. One should then be able to
envision a variety of situations in which the defendant would be highly
blameworthy if the boulder were to careen down the hill, through the
daffodils, and into the plaintiff's house.
The type of power held by the defendant and the type of vulnera-
bility suffered by the plaintiff may vary; the integrity of the plaintiff's
body, mind, or financial affairs may be at stake. The abuse of power in
many cases, however, involves the abuse of information vital to the
plaintiff-the deliberate misstatement of information, the failure to
convey the information to the plaintiff, the defendant's failure to act
properly upon it, or in some cases the defendant's failure to acquire it.
Whether the cases are considered in terms of information costs, cost
avoidance, fairness, or efficiency, the law does have some appropriate
role to play-quite possibly more than simply assigning compensatory
damages responsibility, yet sometimes less than imposing criminal re-
5. See generally M. SHAPo, THE DuTY To ACT-TORT LAW, POWER, & PUBLIC POLICY XV-
xvi, 7-42 (1977) (relationships such as economic, personal, or physical provide bases of power
which often explain the imposition of tort liability).
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sponsibility-both before and after the boulder's static energy is un-
leashed upon the little house at the bottom of the hill.
B. TYPES OF DEFENDANTS, STATES OF MIND, AND
NATURE OF MISDEEDS
An understanding of the punitive damages remedy is facilitated by iso-
lating the contexts in which the remedy may be applied. At least three
classifications are deserving of special scrutiny: (1) the type of defend-
ant involved; (2) the defendant's state of mind; and (3) the nature of the
defendant's misdeed. The implications for fairness and efficiency will
be seen on occasion to differ considerably depending on where the par-
ticular case fits within these three classifications. Some general obser-
vations will be offered here on the importance of variations within the
categories, and the differing effects of these variations on fairness and
efficiency will be examined further in later contexts.
1. Types ofDefendants
There is very little discussion in the cases or commentary on punitive
damages addressing whether and how the standards of misconduct for
which punitive damages are justified should be altered to fit the type of
defendant in the case. Nevertheless, at least three types of defendants
stand out as possibly deserving separate treatment: (1) individual de-
fendants; (2) professional defendants; and (3) institutional defendants.
The kinds and amounts of power a person holds over the welfare of
another will vary among these types of defendants, as will the social
expectations as to how the power should be controlled by each person.
Surely the forms of power and motivations of a drunk driver 6 are dif-
ferent in substantial measure from those of a malpracticing doctor7 or
stock broker,8 and are different in turn from misconduct by a power
company9 or an automotive manufacturer.' 0
6. See, e.g., Taylor v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 90, 598 P.2d 854, 157 Cal. Rptr. 693 (1979)
(drunk driver held liable for punitive damages).
7. See, e.g., Nelson v. Gaunt, 125 Cal. App. 3d 623, 178 Cal. Rptr. 167 (1981) (doctor guilty
of malpractice held liable for punitive damages).
8. See Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1981) (stockbroker held liable
for punitive damages for "churning" of account).
9. See, e.g., Hall v. Consolidated Edison Corp., 104 Misc. 2d 565, 428 N.Y.S.2d 837 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1980) (power company that wrongfully terminated electrical services liable for punitive
damages).
10. See, e.g., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981)
(manufacturer held liable for punitive damages for design of Pinto). For a discussion of punitive
damages in the context of automobile product liability cases, see generally Owen, Crashworthiness
Litigation and Punitive Damages, 4 J. PROD. LIAB. 221 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Crashworihi-
1982]
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In our boulder hypothetical, for example, one might well expect
different things from the defendant-and punishment might well be
more or less deserved and more or less effective--depending on
whether the stone, at the time it started to roll, was under the control of
a private homeowner who owned the lot at the top of the hill, a profes-
sional contractor hired to move the stone to safety, or a stone quarry
company with hundreds of stones on the tops of hundreds of hills. In
general, retribution might often be the more important goal when the
private landowner is the culprit, and deterrence might often be more
effective against the stone company. The punitive damages remedy
therefore should be tailored to the type of defendart in the case.
2. States of Mind
The defendant's apparent state of mind, as Professor Ellis makes
clear,"I has always been of appropriately central importance in defining
liability for punitive damages. One would do well, in the search for
clarification of this area of the law, to inquire past the conventional
verbiage ("malicious," "reckless," "oppressive," "willful and wanton")
into the essential mental conditions that properly might support a puni-
tive award. For present purposes, there appear to me to be three basic
classifications for a defendant's mental state: (1) deliberate (or mali-
cious); (2) evaluative (or reflective); and (3) inadvertent (or impulsive).
The culpability of a defendant's abuse of power, and the appropriate-
ness of punitive damages for that abuse, will be seen to vary with the
different states of mind.
Deliberate (or malicious) conduct may be defined as conduct in-
tended to cause harm for no good reason, which thus is known by the
actor to be wrong. This sort of behavior can be engaged in by all three
of the types of defendants discussed above. For example, a spectator at
an athletic event punches the nose of another whose loud cheering is
annoying; a doctor performs unnecessary surgery for financial gain;
12
or a drug manufacturer advertises its new drug as being free of side
effects, knowing that it is not in order to improve its sales.' 3 Assess-
ments of punitive damages in these situations, involving deliberately
ness]; Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive DamagesAgainst Manufacturers of Defective Products,
49 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Problems].
11. Ellis, supra note 3, at 21 (definition of standards by which punitive damages may be
awarded based on defendant's state of mind). See generally id at Section III (criteria for the
assessment of punitive damages).
12. See Cotgreave v. Public Admin., Il1 Misc. 2d 274, 443 N.Y.S.2d 971 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1981).
13. See Toole v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967).
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inflicted harm, generally would be regarded as appropriate without
much argument about either fairness or efficiency.
Evaluative (or reflective) conduct supposes that the defendant
knowingly sets in motion the instrument of harm only after considered
evaluation of the risks and benefits involved. Unlike the "deliberate"
actor, who knows that no good reason supports the action, the "evalua-
tive" actor has considered-and ultimately has chosen to advance-
certain real increases in welfare expected to result from the chosen be-
havior. For punitive damages properly to lie in this context, the choice
must be "wrong" (i.e., immoral or cost-in effective) and, in addition, the
defendant must know or "recklessly" fail to discover its wrongfulness
before acting.
The facts and issues in this area of evaluative states of mind are
very apt to slip and slide in murky waters that should give one pause
before imposing quasi-criminal liability. The doctor, for example, who
truly believes in the patient's need for surgery may choose to withhold
crucial information from the patient in order to obtain "consent" to
perform the operation. While plainly (and in a sense "deliberately")
wrong under principles requiring informed consent (even if the opera-
tion be successfully performed), one should want considerably more
facts about the transaction-including the type and implications of the
operation-before a judgment properly could be made on punitive
damages in this type of reflective conduct case.
Inadvertent (or impulsive) misconduct supposes that no real
thought was given to the wrongful act or to its implications, but the
conduct was still for some reason very wrong. Drunk driving some-
times might fall within this category,' 4 as might a doctor's neglect in
attending to his seriously ill patient,15 and perhaps also the failure of a
manufacturer to consider testing the safety of a new product in a haz-
ardous situation that consumers will frequently confront. 6 The failure
to give thought to the fact that one's actions (or inactions) may be very
harmful usually does not call for punishment. On occasion, however,
14. See Taylor v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 890, 598 P.2d 854, 157 Cal. Rptr. 693 (1979)
(drunk driver held liable for punitive damages).
15. Cf. Rennewanz v. Dean, 114 Or. 259, 229 P. 372 (1924) (consideration by jury of punitive
damages against defendant physician proper where his treatment of plaintiff patient constituted
gross and reckless negligence).
16. See Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 456, 424 N.E.2d 568 (1981)
(defendant had not tested for the type of roll-over which occurred, although it was a predictable
event).
1982]
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this state of mind may support a punitive award, particularly if an insti-
ttition (or perhaps a professional) is the defendant.
3. Nature of Misdeeds
The final classification of significance involves the question of whether
the defendant's fault was active or passive-whether the charge is one
of misfeasance or nonfeasance. Although this once-proud distinction
no longer holds much sway in determining liability for compensatory
damages, 7 perhaps that trend principally reflects the shift away from
fault in developing compensation schemes. Once compensation is out
of the picture, as it generally is said to be for the punitive damages
issue, and once fault returns as the principal matter of inquiry, we may
well wish to look afresh at the active/passive distinction. 8 While on
occasion a defendant's failure to energize his power to protect the
plaintiff may be flagrant and extreme, his purposeful activation and
release of that power physically upon the plaintiff will more often in-
volve the kind of existential choice for which punishment is in order.
Consider once again the boulder. I think that questions of both
just desert and the effectiveness of deterrence should be examined very
differently depending on whether the boulder person physically pushed
it from its earthen perch atop the hill-even if it were aimed other than
at the house below-or failed instead to guard against the crumbling of
the perch under the boulder's weight. In the first instance, the boulder
pusher made two choices-first, to put the little house at risk; and sec-
ond, the significant decision to put his body behind that choice and
thus to change the course of nature to the detriment of the plaintiff
below. Failing only to prop up the boulder or to build a wall downhill
may instead involve only the first such choice and thus represents a
very different level of irresponsibility. 9 As with the other two catego-
ries discussed above, the active/passive distinction may thus provide
useful insights in the punitive damages inquiry.
II. RECONSIDERING THE PURPOSES AND EFFECTS OF
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Although the functions (or benefits) of punitive damages have been fair
game for courts and commentators for many years, Professor Ellis in
17. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS 338-40 (4th ed. 1971).
18. But see Burk Royalty Co. v. Walls, 616 S.W.2d 911, 922 (rex. 1981) (disapproving any
distinction between active and passive conduct in determining whether such conduct constituted
gross negligence).
19. See infra text accompanying note 31.
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his Fairness and Efficiency article has provided the most helpful general
inquiry into the important other side-the effects (or costs) of the rem-
edy. The purposes and effects of such assessments are of course differ-
ent sides of the same scales, and so they profitably may be examined
side by side as Professor Ellis has done. This section first examines in
the abstract certain aspects of the logic, fairness, and utility underlying
the principal rationales for the punitive damages remedy, and then
turns briefly to the implications for fairness and efficiency that result
when the theory is transported to a court for adjudication.
A. THE FUNCTIONS RECONSIDERED
Broadly speaking, punitive damages serve three principal objectives:
punishment, deterrence, and compensation.20 Each objective may be
splintered into various subgoals. Within the term "punishment," I in-
clude the notions of retribution, moral desert, private and public ven-
geance, vindication, and the moral education of the offender.21 While
this category is broader than Professor Ellis' "retribution" category (in
that I include some instrumentalist goals),22 it usefully leaves the more
starkly "economic" objectives to be considered under the "deterrence"
goal. The second category, "deterrence," includes its little sister, "law
enforcement."23 Included within the third category, "compensation,"
are all the costs of restoring the plaintiff to his pre-injury position in
financial terms, including payment of his attorneys' fees.24
1. Fairness
Although I share Professor Ellis' view that the fairness of punishment
generally centers on the notion of desert, the desert analysis may tend
to focus too narrowly on the defendant in a vacuum. In considering
whether punishment imposed by social authority is fair, I prefer to
move back a step to examine how, why, and to whom the defendant's
conduct was very wrong. There are three notions that I believe to be
particularly important in determining the fairness of the punishment
imposed: theft, power, and social expectations.
Punishable misconduct-conduct that is very wrong--often ap-
20. A fourth goal, law enforcement, may be subsumed within deterrence. See Owen, supra
note 1, at 1287 n.152.
21. Id. at 1279-81.
22. Compare Ellis, supra note 3, at 4-8 (defining punishment in noninstrumentalist terms)
with id at 8-10 (defining deterrence as an instrumentalist objective).
23. See Owen, supra note I, at 1287 n.152.
24. See id. at 1295-97.
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pears to me to involve a form of theft. The object of the theft may take
any form of value, such as wealth, bodily security, or mental security-
including happiness and its underlying values such as privacy, reputa-
tion, freedom of choice and locomotion, and other such intangibles.
The diminution in these values may be said to result from "theft" when
the actor knows before his choice to act or not to act that the losses
which are likely to result to others will most likely exceed the benefits
likely to be achieved. The defendant's choice, although it may "only"
reflect a subconscious (or institutional) election not to consider more
fully the implications of the contemplated action for loss to others, is in
this respect a decision to "steal" some limited resources from the group.
Such actions are plainly in opposition to the fundamental ethic of the
group fairly to protect its resources from waste. 25
Every person has the power to waste the resources of the group.
As the power to do so increases, so too does the opportunity to cause
waste, and the duty so to restrain.26 The group grants operating
licenses to professionals and businesses for the accumulation of extra
power (in the form of information and resources) to be used in provid-
ing services and products to members of the group. An underlying ex-
pectation is that the licensee will exert its power fairly and efficiently
for the general good, and should so deserve a little extra chunk of re-
sources in the form of profit as its reward. When this permitted power
base is abused, however, through the squandering of our resources, the
ethic of the group is fractured. If the person (or licensee) responsible
for the fracture exercised even a passive choice in causing waste, then
punishment of the offender may be required to mend the fabric of the
social rules, to restore a sense of balance to the social compact. The
more aware a person is that his contemplated action (or inaction) is
wasteful, and the more wasteful that it is, the more likely it will be that
the act is one of "theft" and that punishment will be deserved.
Another window on the matter looks through the eyes of a mem-
ber of the group and asks what expectations he may fairly have con-
cerning his protection by the group from other members. Such a rights
perspective must involve at least the expectations that the group will
take all "reasonable" steps to protect each member against "theft"-
against an unprovoked punch in the nose, against surgery known by
25. See generally Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33 VAND. L. REv.
681, 690, 694 (1980) (duty of members of group to avoid waste).
26. Although it may be that persons should have the right to waste resources belonging
solely to themselves, that issue falls outside of the present inquiry.
27. See Owen, supra note 25, at 690,.694.
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the surgeon to be unnecessary, or against the sale of drugs known by
the manufacturer to cause more damage than they cure. To put the
matter another way, in exchange for surrendering his own freedom to
steal from others, one might well expect the group to provide by law a
disincentive against such waste and "theft" by others and to impose a
detriment (punishment) on members guilty of such wrongs. Punish-
ment of such offenses might thus be thought to be a fair result of
"knowing" damage to the public good, and fairness from this perspec-
tive can be seen to run quite close to principles of efficiency as well.
Deterrence and law enforcement for similar reasons appear to be
fair objectives for the law. If one now agrees that "theft" or "knowing"
waste should be discouraged, then one has made the fairness case for
deterrence and law enforcement as well as for punishment. Deterrence
looks at theft from a starting point that views the act as wrong, and
then considers methods that the group may use to discourage persons
from committing such acts. Law enforcement, while including also a
strong preventive aspect, includes as well a retrospective side providing
retribution for the members and the group who ask that their anti-theft
rules be obeyed or, if not, that some commensurate sacrifice be ex-
tracted from the thief.
28
The preventive goal is a crucial one for an economic justification
of punitive damages. Yet whether such awards in fact deter the types
of thefts described, and if so the degree of such deterrence, is a monu-
mental problem which to date has received far too little study.2 9 Pro-
fessor Ellis' analysis provides a very sound beginning for this type of
inquiry, but the issue is so fundamental to punitive damages theory
that it requires many years of work by many persons.
Perhaps the isolation of categories, along the lines begun above,3 °
will provide a helpful starting place. To use the boulder situation, the
risk of incurring liability for punitive damages may have little impact
on the conduct of the homeowner atop the hill. However, if the risk
did alter his behavior, it might be more likely to encourage him more to
act carefully in shifting the boulder from one perch to another than to
get him to act affirmatively to build a wall below the boulder to protect
the little house.3' I also believe that the contractor and, perhaps even
28. For a general discussion of the law enforcement function of punitive damages, see Owen,
supra note 1, at 1287-90.
29. In the products liability context, for example, I have my doubts as to how much of a
deterrent effect punitive damages really have. See Owen, supra note 1, at 1285-86.
30. See supra notes 6-19 and accompanying text.
31. See supra text accompanying note 19.
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to a greater extent, the stone quarry company, would in general be
more sensitive to the deterrent threat of punitive awards than the hill-
top homeowner.32 Yet the analysis of these issues needs further treat-
ment which I hope will follow someday soon.
The final goal, compensation, including payment of the victim's
costs of litigation (including attorneys' fees), is the easiest objective to
state in terms of fairness in a scheme of punitive damages. 33 One might
comfortably posit that, once the group has discovered a theft, the stolen
resources (or a monetary equivalent) should be returned to the rightful
owner-that the thief be forced to make the owner truly "whole."
Surely any transaction costs of accomplishing this restoration should
not fall upon the rightful owner but should be placed instead upon the
thief-to be internalized as one cost of his misbehavior.
For all these reasons, civil punishment (in some amount propor-
tioned to the wrong) appears to accord with the fair expectations of the
group on the limits of the use of the power and resources of its mem-
bers and the consequences of gross abuse.
2. Efficiency
Assuming here that punitive damages effectively deter the proscribed
misconduct, their use (in properly measured amounts) should in gen-
eral promote efficiency. This follows from the above conclusion that
such assessments are fair largely because they punish knowingly waste-
ful behavior. Efficiency as well as fairness thus is served by decreasing
waste.
Professor Ellis limits the types of cases where efficiency is pro-
moted by punitive damages to three: (1) where liability is less probable
than the loss; (2) where legal damages are less in amount than the ac-
tual loss; and (3) where the actual loss avoidance costs are less in
amount than those perceived by the actor.34 Although I agree that in
theory the use of punitive damages in each of these situations (as
known beforehand to the actor) may be efficient, I do not see why the
case for efficiency should be limited by these categories. Assuming that
such damages are shown to deter effectively-to prevent the waste of
more resources than are consumed by application of the rule-and as-
32. This is because of my assumption that business enterprises more than private individuals
are in general better advised on the legal consequences of their activities.
33. See generally Owen, supra note 1, at 1295-97 (punitive damages can help restore plaintiff
to emotional and financial position enjoyed before litigation).
34. See Ellis, supra note 3, at 25.
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suming that punitive damages liability is properly defined and applied,
such a remedy should promote efficiency in nearly every case.
This conclusion flows from my belief that each of Professor Ellis'
categories seems all-inclusive or almost so: none of the categories ap-
pears to exclude many, if any, cases. As for the first category, the real-
world probability that an actor will be caught and held liable for any
loss he causes should always be somewhat less than one. Even the most
flagrant breaches of the social order do not always result in civil liabil-
ity being imposed on the actor for the victim's loss. Thus, upon the
(admittedly sometimes bold) assumption that punitive damages effec-
tively do deter, no case appears to fall outside of the first cateory.
The all-inclusiveness of the second category is even simpler to see.
For one thing, plaintiffs in this nation are only rarely awarded their
litigation costs (including their attorneys' fees).35 Moreover, rarely, if
ever, does a defendant pay in damages for truly all the losses caused by
his wrongful act. Although today the plaintiff may often receive a
judgment sufficient (before attorneys' fees and other costs) to recom-
pense quite fully his resources that were lost, his family, friends, and
employer will likely lose certain other resources beyond the scope of
law. In addition, the public generally may suffer a sense of fear or
demoralization from wrongdoing that is not vindicated beyond requir-
ing payment for the loss. I believe this form of social loss derives much
more broadly than from "street crime" offenses alone,36 and includes
any type of "theft" of resources of the type described above. If, for
example, consumers learn that a leading manufacturer of mouthwash
has deceived them concerning the supposed medicinal qualities of the
product,31 truthful advertising information may thereafter be less likely
to be believed, with a commensurate decrease in the efficiency of the
market (and loss of welfare to the public) for goods of at least that type.
A wrongdoer virtually never pays in compensatory damages for all the
losses he has caused, particularly in cases of extreme wrongdoing for
which punitive damages may be awarded.
Finally, the third category appears far broader, if not all-inclusive,
than Professor Ellis' description would indicate. A "thief' must almost
always perceive a greater benefit from his conduct than would the law.
The nose puncher most certainly places a higher value than the law on
35. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 914(1) (1979).
36. Professor Ellis takes a narrower view. See Ellis, supra note 3, at 28.
37. Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (contrary to the company's
advertising, "Listerine will not help prevent colds or sore throats or lessen their severity").
1982]
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his own emotional cost in constraining his instinctive violence; the doc-
tor who forgets his bleeding patient in the waiting room when the doors
are locked on Friday night has placed a higher value than has the law
on the cost or trouble of assuring all the time that his patients have
been provided with proper care; a manufacturer that fails to test a
product for probable hazards from a likely use may have placed a
higher value on the costs and trouble saved than might the rules of
social economics and the law. And so even category three appears to
cover at least most cases of flagrant misbehavior.
In conclusion, if the normal rules of good behavior are themselves
defined in terms of cost efficiency, and if the threat of punitive damages
will steer persons toward compliance with the rule, then a "proper"
amount of punitive damages should be efficient as a general proposi-
tion rather than in only limited situations. Yet, these factual assump-
tions frequently are missing in real cases, and there are serious
deficiencies in the formulation of the legal rules-and in their adminis-
tration-that serve to frustrate the quest for fairness and efficiency in
this area of the law.
B. UNCERTAINTY IN DEFINITION AND ADMINISTRATION
The most serious difficulty in translating the theory of punitive dam-
ages into practice may well concern the uncertainty that surrounds
their use. Uncertainty both in the meaning and in the application of
punitive damages "rules" diminishes substantially their fairness as well
as their utility, increasing the social costs involved. Professor Ellis has
highlighted perhaps the principal causes of the uncertainty problem-
the vagueness in the definition of the liability rules38 which, in 'turn, is
exacerbated by the very broad discretion accorded to the jury.
3 9
I share the view that the infliction of punishment upon a person
for the commission of a vaguely defined offense normally appears both
unfair and inefficient.40 In the context of punitive damages, I would be
uncomfortable with a standard such as "very bad," "very, very bad," or
"terribly bad," even though these phrases actually comport quite
closely to my intuition as to the type of act that properly calls for a
punitive assessment. With the possible exception of the words "outra-
geous," "malicious," and perhaps "oppressive," the various "bad" for-
mulations just set forth in fact probably define or limit the proscribed
38. See Ellis, supra note 3, at 34-37.
39. See id at 37-39.
40. See Problems, supra note 10, at 36-38; Owen, supra note 25, at 695.
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misconduct at least as accurately as the often hollow (and sometimes
very misleading) words and phrases generally used to describe the mis-
conduct, such as "deliberate," "conscious," "reckless," and "willful and
wanton."'" Although Professor Ellis recognizes that greater verbal cer-
tainty regarding the bounds of punitive damages liability is needed, he
stops short of proposing specific improvements in the current verbal
standards.42
As difficult as the linguistic task may be, some improvement must
be made in the choice of words used to define the boundaries of puni-
tive damages liability. As has been seen, a most important generic con-
cept underlying the goals discussed above involves the notion of a gross
deviation from the social norm. Phrases such as "flagrant disregard" of
the plaintiff's rights and "extreme departure" from the relevant norm





X1 X2 X 3  X
Culpability
Figure 1 illustrates this point. The horizontal axis, X, represents
the culpability scale, beginning at the origin at completely innocent or
nonculpable (very roughly "selfless") and moving toward completely
culpable (very roughly "selfish") behavior at the right. Equilibrium is
set at the point x2 , where the utility of an act is equal for the individual
actor and the group. This point may be assumed as well to be the point
of efficiency, and of the underlying rules of law (as in the Hand ap-
41. See Problems, supra note 10, at 20-26.
42. See Ellis, supra note 3, at 51-53.
43. See Problems, supra note 10, at 20-28.
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proach),4 where the actor's pursuit of his own welfare is maximized
with "due" regard for the welfare of others in the group. The curve
itself, however, represents conduct culpability, not efficiency, for an im-
portant assumption of this essay is that culpability may be a function of
more than efficiency alone. The vertical axis, Y, represents the fre-
quency of the type of conduct in society and for normal individuals
over time. The rule of law (for compensatory damages), ax2 , thus runs
through the equilibrium point to optimize the freedom (or welfare) of
the individual and of the group. The normal individual and social "ac-
tion curve" should look something like curve b; given the assumptions
made above. The curve centers at x1 , rather than x2, because of the
assumption that most persons try most of the time to maximize their
personal welfare within the law rather than at the very point of illegal-
ity (where "excess" damage to the group begins).
Punishment becomes appropriate at point x3 , set at an "extreme"
distance from the norm, where the conduct has become clearly flagrant.
Action to the right of the cx3 line may be considered "theft" as that
term is used above. The cx3 line thus defines the form of behavior
which may properly support a punitive damage award, which is con-
duct represented by the shaded area to the right. Between x2 and x3 ,
an actor's conduct will either derive from a good faith mistake or, if
known to be wrong, will only be a minor theft for which the payment
of compensatory damages will be punishment enough. If in this way
only "extreme" and "flagrant" departures from accepted conduct are
punished, at least fairness should be improved.
Professor Ellis' suggestion as to the need to specify more carefully
the categories of misconduct for which punitive damages are in order 45
is very sound. The various defendant, state of mind, and ac-
tive/passive classifications discussed above were a modest attempt to
begin the formulation of certain categories of this kind. Once the con-
tours of logical categories begin to take shape from further fairness and
utility analysis within particular contexts, the choice of words and
phrases to define the proscribed misconduct should prove more practi-
cable and more helpful. The word "malicious," for example, is virtu-
ally meaningless as applied to passive, institutional failures to consider
the implications of their activities, yet the word applies quite well to an
individual defendant who deliberately and by affirmative action inflicts
harm upon another for no good reason. Categorical definitions of this
44. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
45. See Ellis, supra note 3, at 39-53.
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type, within generic contexts such as those discussed above, should as-
sist in limiting fairly the scope of activity which is subject to punitive
damages.
Efficiency is indeed reduced as legal standards become more
vague.46 At the very least, I agree that litigation costs are increased by
uncertainty in the possibility and amount of punitive damages.47 In
addition, these costs may also increase from uncertainty in how the evi-
dence and argument on punitive damages will affect the underlying
worth of the case on compensatory damages. It would seem as well
that efficiency would suffer too as more "innocent" persons suffered
punishment from vagueness in the rules, and as more "guilty" ones
escaped. Moreover, if one accepts the premise that more persons (and
perhaps more institutions) are risk-averse than are risk-takers, uncer-
tainty in this area of the law will reduce the amount of socially useful
behavior as it approaches the compensatory liability "line."
1II. IMPROVING FAIRNESS AND EFFICIENCY
There are at least three ways in which the fairness, and efficiency in
some respects, of punitive damages law can be improved. First, as dis-
cussed above, precision in defining the standards of misconduct needs
to be improved. Second, the courts (or legislatures) need to impose
various rules of law to reduce these vagueness costs. Third, there needs
to be a significant reallocation of judicial power in this area of the law
from the jury to the judge.
46. See id at 43-53.
47. Seeid at 43-46.
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While an extended examination of these three approaches must be
deferred, their general effects may be illustrated by reference to Figure
2 below.48
FIGURE 2
C3 C1 C2  C
X X5 X43X2X1
Culpability decreases from left to right on the horizontal axis, and the
line XC separates conduct properly calling for punitive damages (on
the left) from that which does not (on the right). The shaded area rep-
resents conduct that is in fact subject to punitive damages under the
prevailing rules. The system improves in fairness and efficiency with
decreases in the unshaded area to the left of XC and in the shaded area
to the right. These areas where the legal results are "wrong" are indeed
quite large, as Professor Ellis indicates,49 because of the significant un-
certainty in this area of the law.
The trend toward more expansive use of punitive awards may in-
deed decrease somewhat the number of guilty persons who escape fair
punishment (the unshaded area to the left), but one must recognize as
well that there is a commensurate increase in the number of innocent
persons who are thereby punished by mistake (the shaded area to the
right). The ratio of "innocent" to "guilty" parties punished by expan-
sion of this remedy, at least in products cases, may well be unfairly
high.50 The remarks that follow, therefore, should be considered
48. Figure 2 is based closely upon the version of Professor Ellis' Figure 5 presented at the
Liberty Fund Seminar on Punitive Damages in Atlanta, Georgia on February 12-14, 1982. The
earlier form of the figure was retained since it well illustrates this Comment's points.
49. See Ellis, supra note 3, at 40-43.
50. For a general discussion of the fairness and logic of applying punitive damages in prod-
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against the assumption that fairness in the punitive damages system
needs more improvement than efficiency at the present time. Yet effi-
ciency is a crucial goal and should not be permitted to suffer much
from efforts to improve the fairness in application of the doctrine.
A. PRECISION IN STANDARDS
Precision in the legal standards of liability should indeed "improve"
the system, as discussed above, and hence reduce the area of wrong
results. The left ray in Figure 2 should thus shift to c2, and the right
ray to x2 .
If one is willing to sacrifice a little efficiency for a little fairness, a
"clear and convincing" evidentiary test could be imposed, analogous to
the criminal law's higher burden of proof, to assure that close cases are
resolved in favor of the accused."1 At least in the case of institutional
defendants, where a jury's bias may often lean toward guilt,52 such a
standard should serve roughly to balance at least the efficiency scales.
This higher burden of proof will serve to relieve some guilty persons of
liability, and hence to shift the left ray back perhaps to c,,, but it also
will assure that fewer innocents are wrongly punished, and thereby
shift the right ray to x 3 .
B. RULES OF LAW
Another helpful change in the administration of punitive damages law
would be to establish rules of law to govern recurring patterns of con-
duct and the nearly intractable problems in determining the "optimal"
amount for such damages in every case. For example, an arbitrary
floor might be placed on such awards, guaranteeing the plaintiff full
recompense for the costs of litigation, and an arbitrary cap as well.
5 3
The cap for punitive awards might be, for example, the greater of
(1) double the compensatory-damages, or (2) the costs of litigation plus
$10,000. While some particularly guilty (and wealthy) persons would
thereby escape some punishment that was deserved, shifting the left ray
to c3 , that cost, I think, would be at least offset by the increased fairness
and efficiency of protecting innocents against undeserved punishment,
shifting the right ray to x4.
ucts liability cases, see Crashworthiness, supra note 10; Owen, supra note 1, at 1268-77; Problems,
supqra note 10, at 15-16, 44-68.
51. See Problems, supra note 10, at 58-59.
52. See Id. at 10-12.
53. Cf. id. at 48 (suggesting a possible punitive damage limit of $1,000,000 per plaintiff).
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C. REALLOCATING JUDICIAL POWER
A final alteration that should strengthen the system in many respects
would be to make a major shift of power from the jury to the judge.
Improper claims for punitive damages would thus more likely be
screened out at an early stage of litigation-typically on motion for
summary judgment-with substantial savings in fairness, litigation
costs, and the risk of a final wrong result. Judges have more familiarity
than do juries with distinguishing "wrong" from "very wrong" behav-
ior (and fixing the appropriate level of punishment therefor) upon a
formal social scale, and judges should have in general less rigid precon-
ceptions that may bias the result. This firmer judicial hold on the puni-
tive damages issue should be made throughout the case, from early
pretrial rulings to the final issues on appeal. 4 While very few more
guilty persons would be found liable from this approach, I do not think
that many clearly guilty would thereby be let go, and so the left ray in
Figure 2 should not shift significantly. There should result, however, a
major shift in the right-hand ray, to point x5 , protecting many in-
nocents from punishment not deserved, with substantial savings in fair-
ness and efficiency alike.
Once reforms of the type sketched above are thought through and
put in place, the final punitive damages system should look like Figure
3.
54. See generall id. at 50-59 (discussing means of increasing judicial control over punitive
damages assessments). For a helpful analysis arguing for tightening judicial control in products
liability litigation generally, see Twerski, Seizing the Middle Ground Between Rules and Standards






This figure illustrates a scheme where a fair proportion of guilty are
permitted to escape, but where the risk of punishing innocents is quite
low. While fairness would most clearly benefit from these reforms, effi-
ciency on balance should likely move forward too. This balance seems
appropriate for a nation that seeks to accomodate both justice and effi-
ciency, but that casts the final vote for fairness.
CONCLUSION
Fairness and efficiency are slippery notions, and many complex issues
lurk deep within. Yet the legal system to be sound must struggle to
achieve both goals as much as possible. As the law of punitive dam-
ages has been developed and applied, much in both fairness and effi-
ciency has been left aside. Yet the defects in this remedy call not for its
general abolition, because it can serve well both fairness and utility.
Although these goals could be achieved to some extent, and sometimes
better, by a wider application of the criminal law, the public penal law
appears to me too rigid, too expensive, and too threatening to our free-
doms to expand it further to fill the gap. And so I think that punitive
damages are for the best, and that they are here to stay. Many serious
problems remain, however, in their definition and application, and one
may hope for further efforts'at improvement of this important area of
the law.
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